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Abstract 
 
Section 28 of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995 
allows people to apply to the Family Court to change the sex marker on their birth 
certificate. This essay argues that this provision is out-dated and does not serve the needs 
of the trans community. It is based on the medical model of sex, and requires medical 
evidence that the applicant’s body conforms sufficiently to that of the “nominated sex”. 
This essay suggests a reform based on the self-identification model, which exists in 
Argentina for birth certificates, and in New Zealand for passports and drivers’ licences. 
Such a reform of s 28 would bring birth certificates in line with these other documents, 
leading to more consistency and increased respect for the human rights of trans people. 
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I Introduction 
 
When a birth is registered, a sex is recorded on the birth certificate. This is the starting 
point of medical and legal classification of bodies into categories of female and male. 
People who go through life identifying as the sex/gender assigned to them at birth 
(cisgender people) do not have to prove anything about their genitals, chromosomes, 
hormones, lifestyle or behaviour in order to be legally recognised in their self-identified 
sex. For example, I am a cisgender woman. I was assigned female on my birth certificate, 
and I continue to identify and present myself as a woman. All of my identity documents 
reflect my internally felt and externally expressed female sex. The issue of changing sex 
markers on birth certificates does not affect me. In recognising this privilege, I approach 
this topic with particular sensitivity.1  
 
The ability to change sex markers on birth certificates is of vital importance to some 
people. This includes trans people, who are “those people who do not perceive or present 
their gender identity as the same as that expected of the group of people who were given 
the equivalent sex designation at birth.”2 I follow the approach of using “trans” as an 
umbrella term which encompasses a range of identities that fit this definition, including 
transgender and transsexual.3 In doing so I recognise that many people who could be 
described as trans do not identify with that term. For example, Māori may identify as 
whakawahine, hinehi, hinehua, or tangata ira tane, and Pasifika people may identify as 
fa’afafine (Samoa), fekaleiti (Tonga), akava’ine (Cook Islands), mahu (Hawai’i), vaka se 
  
1 For a discussion of cisgender privilege generally, see Julia Serano Whipping Girl: a Transsexual Woman 
on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity (Seal Press, Emeryville CA, 2007) at ch 8. 
2 Stephen Whittle Respect and Equality: Transsexual and Transgender Rights (Cavendash Publishing 
Limited, London, 2002) at xxii. 
3 These concepts are contested and debates about their meaning are outside my scope. See Serano above n 
1, at 25-27; and Dean Spade “Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender” (2003) 18 Berkeley Women’s LJ 
15 at 15-16, n 2. 
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lewa (Fiji), rae rae (Tahiti), or fiafifine (Niue).4 These terms can only be understood 
within their cultural context and are not translations of English concepts.5 
 
Sex and gender are contested terms which have in various contexts been both 
distinguished and equated by both the law and by trans people seeking legal recognition.6 
In this essay I focus on sex rather than gender because it is sex that is recorded on birth 
certificates; however I acknowledge that gender is the more socially and culturally 
relevant category. I use the words “trans woman” and “trans man” where relevant. 
“Trans” is an adjective, which describes one aspect of a person’s identity; a trans woman 
is a woman who was assigned male at birth.7 Some trans people (and some people who 
are not trans) do not identify as either male or female. These identities include 
genderqueer, androgynous, bigendered and non-gendered. I use the words “they” and 
“their” as singular pronouns rather than “he or she” and “his or her”, to acknowledge and 
respect this range of identities.  
 
Trans people are frequently subjected to medical and legal scrutiny in order to achieve 
recognition of their sex/gender. This high standard is often impossible to attain, leaving 
people with identity documents that do not match their identity. While the process has 
been simplified for passports and for the drivers’ licence register in New Zealand, the law 
for changing sex markers on birth certificates remains restrictive. It is governed by s 28 
of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995 (BDMRRA). 
  
4 Human Rights Commission To Be Who I Am: Report of the Inquiry into Discrimination Experienced by 
Transgender People (Human Rights Commission, 2007) [Transgender Report] at 13; Aids Foundation 
“Pacific Island Sexual Minority Gathering” (19 October 2007) Scoop <www.scoop.co.nz>. 
5 See generally Tess Lomax “Whakawahine – a Given or Becoming?” in Jessica Hutchings and Clive Aspin 
(eds) Sexuality and the Stories of Indigenous People (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2007) 82); Niko Besnier 
and Kalissa Alexeyeff (eds) Gender on the Edge: Transgender, Gay, and Other Pacific Islanders 
(University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2014). 
6 For an excellent summary of different legal and theoretical positions on this, see Laura Grenfell “Making 
sex: law’s narratives of sex, gender and identity” (2003) 23 LS 66 at 91-100. For a trans perspective which 
rejects the distinction between sex and gender, see Dylan Vade “Expanding Gender and Expanding the 
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender 
People” (2005) 11 MIJGL 253 at 278-284. 
7 Serano, above n 1, at 29. 
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In this essay I argue that the medical model of sex that this section is based on is out-
dated, and that s 28 should be reformed so that it is based on self-identification. 
 
Another group who may not identify with the sex on their birth certificate is intersex 
people, that is, people who are “born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t 
seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male”.8 A small number of such people are 
recorded as “indeterminate” at birth, but most are assigned either male or female by 
doctors.9 For intersex people who want legal recognition as intersex, s 85 of the 
BDMRRA allows people to change to “indeterminate” rather than “male” or female” if 
they can prove that they were “indeterminate” at birth and that the sex they were assigned 
at birth was an error. There has been at least one successful application;10 however, 
discussion of this provision is outside the scope of this essay.  
 
Intersex people who cannot meet this requirement have to use s 28 in order to change the 
sex on their birth certificate.11 There are no available cases about intersex people using s 
28 so this is not part of my analysis. However, many of the criticisms I raise in relation to 
trans people have similar (and potentially different) implications for intersex people.12 
Under s 28, it is possible to change from “indeterminate” to either male or female but 
there is no option of changing to “indeterminate”. The possibility of a third option for 
people (whether intersex or not) on birth certificates is outside the scope of this essay; 
however, I do recognise that having more than two options is an essential aspect of self-
identification.13 Also outside my scope is whether to remove sex markers on birth 
certificates entirely.14 
 
  
8 Intersex Society of North America “What is intersex?” Intersex Society of North America 
<www.isna.org>. 
9 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at 7.32 and 7.38. 
10 Human Rights Commission Human Rights in New Zealand: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa (Human 
Rights Commission, 2010) at 313. 
11 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [7.26]. 
12 At [7.26]. 
13 Spade, above n 3, at 29. 
14 Dean Spade “Documenting Gender” (2008) 59 Hastings LJ 731 at 802-804 and 806. 
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In this essay I argue that the medical model which underpins s 28 should be rejected in 
favour of a self-identification model. Section 29, which applies to minors, should also be 
reformed, but this is outside my scope. Part II explains that sex markers on birth 
certificates matter to trans people, because if changed they can be used as an affirmation 
of their identity in various contexts. In Part III I describe the three major approaches to 
legal recognition of sex: biological, in which sex is defined by chromosomes, gonads and 
genitals, and is fixed at birth; medical, in which sex is defined by medical experts and 
changeable by sufficient medical treatment; and self identification, in which sex is 
defined by individuals themselves. 
 
New Zealand’s current law is described in Part IV. It requires that as a result of medical 
treatment, the applicant’s body conforms sufficiently to that of a person of the 
“nominated sex”. Case law has established that this does not necessarily require surgery, 
although some degree of medical intervention, at least in the form of hormones, is 
required. Part V critiques this approach because of its reliance on the medical model of 
sex, which requires conformation to normative standards especially in terms of the 
medical intervention required. This means that legal recognition is out of reach for many 
trans people.  
 
In the last Part, I argue that New Zealand should adopt an approach based on self-
identification for sex markers on birth certificates, as has been done in Argentina. This 
would increase compliance with human rights standards, and also lead to consistency 
with the sex markers on passports and drivers’ licences, which are both based on self-
identification in New Zealand.  
 
II Sex Markers on Birth Certificates Matter 
 
Unlike many countries, New Zealand does not have any official identity documents.15 A 
birth certificate is simply evidence that a birth occurred and in fact contains a disclaimer 
  
15  Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [6.4]. 
  
 
8
that, “this certificate is not evidence of the identity of the person presenting it”.16 The 
Human Rights Commission’s (HRC) 2007 report To Be Who I Am (the Transgender 
Report) was the first inquiry into trans experience in New Zealand and heard from over 
200 trans people. It found that despite this disclaimer, “documents issued by the state 
assist most people to verify their identity and most people refer to these documents as 
‘forms of identity’.”17 The ability to change the sex marker on birth certificates was 
important to trans people:18  
 
An amended birth certificate is often treated as proof of a person’s sex. A trans 
person can then rely on the birth certificate for a variety of purposes, including 
establishing identity. 
 
The Transgender Report found that there were barriers to changing the sex marker on 
birth certificates and that this was an issue for trans people:19 
 
On the one hand, the difference between the sex recorded on a birth certificate and 
how a trans person presents often results in suspicion and/or discrimination. On the 
other hand, the majority of trans people were unable to comply with the statutory test 
for change of sex on a birth certificate, which might help to prevent such suspicion 
or discrimination.  
 
For example, people have been required to produce birth certificates to letting agencies,20 
and to prospective employers,21 in order to verify their identity. This causes considerable 
anxiety and discrimination when the sex marker does not match a person’s identity. 
 
  
16 Department of Internal Affairs “Certificate and Printout: Frequently Asked Questions” Department of 
Internal Affairs <www.dia.govt.nz>. 
17 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [6.4]. 
18 At [8.9]. 
19 At [6.24]. 
20 At [4.15]. 
21 At [3.45]. 
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Birth certificates often act as a gateway to correcting a person’s sex classification in 
institutions such as banks, hospitals and universities.22 A corrected birth certificate can 
facilitate the correction of sex/gender records in these other contexts, while if unchanged 
it can act as a barrier and source of discrimination. 
 
The introduction of a self-identification approach to the sex marker on passports (see Part 
V) has reduced the relevance of birth certificates to some extent.23 It is no longer 
necessary to have an amended birth certificate in order to change the sex marker on a 
passport, as it was previously.24 Passports are accepted in most contexts for identifying 
purposes. For example the new RealMe system of identification, which is used by all 
government departments and agencies, accepts passports as a basis of recognition.25 On a 
day-to-day level, passports, and drivers’ licences are much more commonly used forms 
of identification than birth certificates. However, passports need to be renewed every 5 
years,26 a somewhat inconvenient and expensive process for people who do not intend to 
travel. Birth certificates offer a much more permanent form of documentation, especially 
for those who do not want or need a passport. They are still seen as the most important 
identity document.27 
 
Additionally, despite the shift towards acceptance of passports to verify identity, there are 
some situations where birth certificates are still the only relevant document. For example, 
trans people who have changed the sex on their birth certificate will be housed in a prison 
that reflects their sex. Those who have not done so must apply to the Chief Executive of 
the Department of Corrections to be housed in the correct prison, with such cases being 
decided on a discretionary basis. Prisoners who have not changed their birth certificate 
  
22 At [3.30]. 
23 Elisabeth McDonald “The Legal Status of Transgender and Transsexual Persons in Aotearoa New 
Zealand” in Jens Scherpe (ed) The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons (Intersentia, 
Cambridge) (forthcoming) at 10-11. 
24 Department of Internal Affairs “Information about Changing Sex / Gender Identity” New Zealand 
Passports <www.passports.govt.nz>. 
25 New Zealand Government “Getting started with RealMe” RealMe <www.realme.govt.nz>. 
26 Department of Internal Affairs “Five year passports – some important information” New Zealand 
Passports <www.passports.govt.nz>. 
27 McDonald, above n 23, at 10. 
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and who are serving sentences or facing charges for serious sexual offending are not able 
to apply to be housed in the correct prison.28 This sets up unequal treatment on the basis 
of whether or not the birth certificate has been changed.  
 
Another example of this is that the sex of a parent registered on their child’s birth 
certificate is determined according to the parent’s birth certificate. A trans man was told 
he could not be registered as his child’s father unless he changed the sex marker on his 
own birth certificate to male.29 There may be a similar issue regarding death certificates 
being determined on the basis of birth certificates when there is conflict.30 
 
Perhaps most importantly, having a birth certificate that reflects a person’s gender is an 
important affirmation of identity in itself.31 The Transgender Report quotes one 
respondent as saying “My birth certificate is fixed as the world judged me when I 
couldn’t speak for myself.”32 Birth certificates symbolise citizenship and so correct sex 
markers on birth certificates also symbolise recognition and belonging.  
 
III Legal models for changing sex on birth certificates 
 
Legal approaches to sex have varied across time and across jurisdictions. Franklin Romeo 
has classified these into three broad models in the United States context: the biological 
model, the medical model and the self-determination model.33 It should be noted both that 
this classification was in the context of litigation (regarding discrimination, healthcare 
and privacy) rather than identity documents, and that self-identification was a potential 
new model that did not yet exist in United States case law or legislation. In this Part, I 
  
28 Anne Tolley “Prison changes to increase rehab and safety” (25 September 2013) Beehive: the official 
website of the New Zealand Government <www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
29 Human Rights Commission, above n 4 at [4.12] 
30 McDonald, above n 23, at 11, n 62. 
31 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [6.2]. 
32 At [6.20]. 
33 Franklin Romeo “Beyond the Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in 
the Law” (2005) 36 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 713.  
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briefly describe each of these models. I relate these models to the New Zealand context in 
the following Part. 
A The Biological Model 
 
The biological model is the most restrictive approach. The English case of Corbett v 
Corbett34 in 1970 was the foundational Common Law case regarding the validity of trans 
marriages and was followed in several other jurisdictions.35 It found that chromosomes, 
genitals, and gonads were determinants of sex for the purposes of marriage.36 Ormrod J 
ruled that “marriage [was] a relationship which depends on sex rather than gender”,37 and 
that it was impossible to change one’s sex even by surgically removing and 
reconstructing genitals.38 He also found that marriage required the capacity for “natural” 
heterosexual intercourse, and that this was impossible with an “artificial cavity”.39  
 
While the Corbett decision related to marriage, the reasoning underpinning it continues to 
be followed in several jurisdictions with regard to birth certificates. Generally this is 
characterised by a lack of legislative provision to enable a change of sex marker, since 
this is the de facto situation.40 For example, there are three states in the United States that 
do not allow sex markers on birth certificates to be changed, one of which has an express 
prohibition.41 There are also 14 countries in Europe which do not allow legal gender 
recognition for trans people at all.42  
  
34 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33.  
35 Grenfell, above n 6, at 69-79. 
36 Corbett, above n 34, at 47 and 48. 
37 At 49. 
38 At 47. 
39 At 49. 
40 Laura Grenfell and Anne Hewitt “Gender Regulation: Restrictive, Facilitative or Transformative Laws?” 
(2012) 34 Sydney L Rev 761 at 771-772. 
41 The states are Idaho, Ohio, and Tennessee. Tennessee has an express prohibition. Lamda Legal 
“Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State by State Guidelines” Lamda Legal 
<www.lambdalegal.org>. 
42 Transgender Europe “Trans Rights Europe Map 2014” (15 April 2014) Transgender Europe 
<www.tgeu.org>. 
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B The Medical Model 
 
In many countries the biological model has been rejected in favour of a legal model 
which acknowledges the possibility of changing sex in some circumstances.43 As Romeo 
describes it, this model relies on medical evidence (which can be psychological, or 
physical, or both),  “to establish gender transgression as legitimate and therefore worthy 
of recognition and protection under the law.”44  There is a spectrum of approaches both 
between and within jurisdictions that fall under the medical model. 
 
At its most restrictive, this model is only available to “post-operative” trans people, that 
is, people who have had some surgery to reconstruct their genitals. Australian academics 
Grenfell and Hewitt call this a “sex as congruent anatomy and psychology” model.45 This 
approach exists for birth certificates in many jurisdictions, including almost all American 
states where changing the sex marker is possible at all,46 and most Australian states.47 Of 
the 35 countries in Europe where a legal change of sex is possible, 20 require surgery.48 
 
At the other end of the medical model spectrum is an approach which “gives primacy to 
behaviour and psychology and considers anatomy to be of secondary relevance”.49 
  
43 Grenfell, above n 6, at 79-86. 
44 Romeo, above n 33, at 724. 
45 Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 40, at 766-769. 
46 There are 52 authorities that issue birth certificates in the USA. As of 2008, 19 had no official rule but 
allow the change in practice. The other 30 specifically authorised the changing of sex markers – Spade 
“Documenting Gender above n 14 at 767-768. These numbers have not significantly changed, see Lamda 
Legal, above n 41. All of the jurisdictions that allow the change require surgery, except Oregon, 
Washington, Vermont and New York States, and the District of Columbia – Mary Emily O’Hara “AMA 
Says Transgender People Shouldn’t Require Surgery to Change Their Birth Certificate” (12 June 2014) 
Vice News <news.vice.com>. 
47 Surgery to alter reproductive organs is required in NSW, NT, Qld, Tas and Vic. SA and WA require a 
“medical or surgical procedure ... to alter the genitals”. See Australian Human Rights Commission Sex 
Files: the Legal Recognition of Sex in Documents and Government Records (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2009) at 16-17. See Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 40, at 773-778 for how the WA and SA 
laws have been interpreted. ACT changed its legislation in 2014, to require “appropriate clinical treatment”. 
See Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT). 
48 Transgender Europe, above n 42. 
49 Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 40, at 769. 
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Grenfell and Hewitt do not consider this to be part of the medical model, describing it 
instead as “transformative”.50 However they cite the Australian passport policy, which 
requires medical evidence of “appropriate clinical treatment”51 as an example of this.  
They argue that this requirement could include counselling and other therapy, suggesting 
a more psychological focus.52 According to the Australian Passport Office, the 
“appropriate clinical treatment” does not have to be specified so it is left up to the doctor 
to decide.53 That some form of medical evidence is required situates this approach within 
the medical model, despite its somewhat more relaxed requirements than the approach 
described above.  
 
C The Self-Identification Model 
 
The third model allows legal recognition of a person’s sex based on self-identification. 
This approach is grounded in self-determination, that is, the broad idea that a person 
should be able to determine their own sex/gender for all purposes, and that gender is “a 
healthy and legitimate expression of a person’s identity”.54 Self-identification refers more 
specifically to the ability to identify as one chooses on legal documents.55 Under this 
model, legal recognition is based solely on a person’s identity and does not require any 
medical (or any other) evidence. 
 
Dean Spade, a trans activist, lawyer and academic, describes self-identification in the 
following terms:56 
 
  
50 Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 40, at 762 . 
51 Australian Passport Office “Sex and Gender Diverse Passport Applicants” Australian Passport Office 
<www.passports.gov.au>. 
52 Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 40, at 772. 
53 Australian Passport Office, above n 51. 
54 Romeo, above n 33, at 739 
55 Romeo uses “self-determination” because his article is about gender recognition more broadly – above n  
33. The other authors I cite in this essay tend to be discussing identity documents so use “self-
identification”.  
56 Spade “Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender”, above n 3, at 29. 
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I would like people to have the freedom to determine their own gender identity and 
expression … And I would want no person to be required to show medical or 
psychiatric evidence to document that they are who and what they say they are. I 
would like self identification to be the determining factor for a person’s membership 
in a gender category to the extent that knowledge of the person’s membership in 
such a category is necessary. 
 
The self-identification model is illustrated by Argentina’s 2012 Gender Identity Law57 
which is heralded by activists around the world as best practice.58 Article 4 requires that 
for a person’s sex to be amended on their birth certificate and national identity card, they 
have to be at least 18 (there is a separate process for minors), submit a request to the 
relevant authority, and provide a new first name that they want to be registered under. 
The law is explicit that: 
 
[I]n no case will it be needed to prove that a surgical procedure for total or partial 
genital reassignment, hormonal therapies or any other psychological or medical 
treatment has taken place. 
 
This emphasis on not requiring medical evidence is key to self-identification. The very 
straightforward administrative procedure59 also gives practical effect to this model.  
 
IV The New Zealand Legislation and Case Law  
 
In New Zealand, the process for changing sex markers on birth certificates is governed by 
s 28 of the BDMRRA and has been clarified by case law, especially the Michael 
  
57 Ley No 26743 9 May 2012 (AR) (translated ed: Alejandra Sardá (translator) “Argentina’s Gender 
Identity Law” Global Action for Trans Equality <transactivists.org>.) 
58 See for example Transgender Europe Legal Gender Recognition in Europe Toolkit (Transgender Europe 
[no location given], 2013) at 49-54; Jack Byrne License to Be Yourself: Laws and advocacy for legal 
gender recognition of trans people (The Open Society Foundations, New York, 2014) at 9, 17, 23, 24, 41 
and 43-45; and Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) UPR Coalition 2013 “Submission 
from Aotearoa New Zealand’s Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) UPR Coalition 
2013” at [13]. 
59 Article 6. 
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decision.60 This law sits somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of medical models 
described in the previous Part, because it requires some degree of medical intervention, 
but not necessarily surgery. 
 
When the BDMRRA was passed, New Zealand courts had already adopted the medical 
model of sex in the context of marriage in M v M61 and Attorney-General v Family Court 
at Otahuhu.62 In M v M, the court found a 12 and a half year marriage between a man and 
a trans woman was valid. Judge Aubin rejected Corbett, and concluded:63  
 
In so far as these proceedings come down in the end to the definition of "woman", 
there is no medical evidence in the case which is persuasive against the view that 
genetic considerations can be displaced by events occurring in the course of the 
person's life that cumulatively take that person out of the sexual category into which 
he or she was born through a state of limbo and into the haven of the opposite sex.  
 
Despite the progressive (for its time) approach to marriage, the courts had been unable to 
take a similar approach to birth certificates. The case of Re T had found that changing the 
sex marker was not possible (except in the case of mistake at birth) because there was no 
statutory provision to enable such a change.64 
 
The BDMRRA consolidated and amended the existing legislation. The clauses that 
became s 28 were the most contentious aspect of the Bill.65 As introduced in 1989, the 
Bill required that an applicant “has undergone surgical and medical procedures that have 
effectively given the person the physical conformation of a person of the opposite sex”. 
However, the Select Committee thought this standard was too high, and so the provision 
  
60 “Michael” v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2008) 27 FRNZ 58 (FC). 
61 M v M (marriage: transexuals) [1991] NZFLR 337 (FC). 
62 Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu (1994) 12 FRNZ 643 (HC). 
63 M v M, above n 61, at 348. 
64 Re T [1975] 2 NZLR 449 (SC). 
65 (15 May 1990) 507 NZPD 1356 and (20 Mar 1991) NZPD 513 NZPD 940. 
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was amended several times.66 The change in wording was summarised by MP Richard 
Northey during the third reading:67 
 
The select committee … recognised that it was principally a psychological, rather 
than a surgical, matter of identity, and that to require people to go through the full 
gamut of very expensive surgery in order simply to have themselves recorded on 
their birth certificate as being the sex with which they identify was inappropriate. 
 
Most of s 28 is straightforward. It is set out in full in the Appendix. The pivotal provision 
is s 28(3)(c)(i), which contains three limbs that must each be satisfied “on the basis of 
expert medical evidence”. The first limb requires that the applicant has assumed the 
gender identity of the nominated sex.68 This requirement has never been contentious. The 
second limb requires that the applicant:69  
 
… has undergone such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical experts 
as desirable to enable persons of the genetic and physical conformation of the 
applicant at birth to acquire a physical conformation that accords with the gender 
identity of a person of the nominated sex. 
 
This “physical conformation” requirement is discussed in more detail below. The third 
limb requires that “as a result of the medical treatment undertaken, [the applicant will] 
maintain a gender identity of a person of the nominated sex”.70  This requirement is 
rarely at issue, although in one case where the applicant’s transition was relatively recent 
there was more emphasis on this.71 
 
  
66 See Michael, above n 60, at [41]-[51] for a thorough discussion of the legislative history. 
67 (28 March 1995) 547 NZPD 6465. 
68 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, s 28(3)(c)(i)(A). 
69 Section 28(3)(c)(i)(B). 
70 Section 28(3)(c)(i)(C) (emphasis added). 
71 H v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages FC Waitakere FAM-2009-090-002000 21 
September 2010 at [26]-[27]. 
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The interpretation of s 28(3)(c)(i)(B) was uncertain until the 2008 Michael decision. 
Many submitters to the Transgender Inquiry in 2007 thought that the physical 
conformation requirement:72 
 
… meant that they must have had ‘full gender reassignment surgery’. A number 
were given this advice by staff at the Department of Internal Affairs or at their local 
Family Court. Trans people said the statutory test was unfair and problematic given 
the reality that most will never be able to access the full range of surgical 
procedures.  
 
The Michael case arose partly in response these concerns.73 At issue in the Michael case 
was:74 
 
… at what point short of complete gender reassignment surgery a person’s physical 
appearance has changed such that it “accords with the gender identity of a person of 
the nominated sex” [and] [m]ore particularly, whether an applicant must have 
undergone surgery to alter their genitals to satisfy that test[.] 
 
Judge Fitzgerald approached this section by looking carefully at the wording. Relevantly, 
he found that “medical” was defined in s 2 of the BMDRRA as including psychological 
and surgical treatment, and could also include hormone treatment.75 “Physical 
conformation”, he said, “refers to the structure or appearance of the applicant’s body or 
physical characteristics”.76 “Usually regarded by medical experts as desirable”:77 
 
… means the assessment of what is desirable is that of a group or consensus of 
medical experts, rather than the opinion of an individual medical expert. The test is 
  
72 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [6.21]. 
73 Michael, above n 60, at [3]-[4], and [108]-[111]. 
74 At [71]. 
75 At [62]. 
76 At [66]. 
77 At [63] (emphasis added). 
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not what the applicant considers to be desirable for him/her to achieve personal 
comfort with, or physical conformity to, their nominated gender identity.  
 
Rather:78  
 
The focus of the legal test is the nature of the medical (psychological and surgical) 
treatment received and it’s [sic] effect on the degree to which the applicant’s 
physical conformation accords with that of the nominated gender. 
 
Judge Fitzgerald concluded in relation to the physical conformation requirement:79  
 
I do not think it appropriate or relevant to talk in terms of “thresholds” or “points on 
the continuum of surgical treatments” in a generalised way in cases under the 
section. I do not believe Parliament intended there be a standardised test to apply to 
all applicants and to do so would be to misunderstand transsexualism and the 
treatment for it. … Just how much surgery [the applicant] needs to have had is 
determined on a case by case basis by reference to the evidence in the particular 
case, including that of the medical experts. 
 
Thus Judge Fitzgerald held that “full” surgery is not required, but indicated that some 
degree of surgery is necessary. On the facts of the case, he decided that a combination of 
psychological counselling, continuous hormone therapy for four years and a bilateral 
mastectomy were sufficient to meet the test in s 28.80 
 
In C-DCT, the court held it was following Michael,81 but found that:82  
 
  
78 At [70]. 
79 At [72]. 
80 At [88]-[90]. 
81 Re C-DCT [2012] NZFC 10036 at [8]. 
82 At [14]. 
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It is abundantly clear that the point at which treatment means a successful gender 
reassignment really comes down to a matter of individual choice and individual 
comfort. 
 
This appears to contradict the passage of Michael quoted above, which said that it was 
not about personal comfort but rather a standard decided by medical experts generally. 
 
The HRC’s Human Rights in New Zealand report raised concerns about the interpretation 
of the physical conformation requirement, particularly in relation to trans women. It 
pointed out that Michael focused on the irreversible chest surgery, and that there was no 
equivalent procedure for trans women, who generally develop breasts through hormonal 
treatment rather than surgery.83 Additionally, “the Commission has been informed of 
other decisions where trans women have been required to show evidence of full sex-
reassignment surgery.”84 This suggests an inconsistent interpretation, with the court 
requiring surgery in some cases but not others. 
 
There are four subsequent cases where trans women were successful in their applications 
despite having undergone no surgery. However, two of the applicants said they wanted 
surgery but could not afford it,85 one was on the waiting list,86 and the other was about to 
undergo surgical treatment.87 Combined, these cases suggest that desire for surgery, if not 
actual plans for it, is considered to be a relevant factor. This presents a barrier for the 
large number of trans people, especially trans women, who never intend to have any 
surgery. 
 
  
83 Human Rights Commission, above n 10 at 319. 
84 At 319. This was not the outcome in any of the available cases, however. 
85 Basinger v Registrar General [2013] NZFC 3562 at [6]; M M T v  R-G B D M [2012] NZFC 3533 at [7]. 
86 DAC v Registrar General Births Deaths & Marriages [2013] NZFC 1998 at [13]. 
87 H, above n 71,at [27]. 
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The information on the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) website sets out the 
legislation and the Michael decision. It stresses that decisions are made on a case-by-case 
basis and that: 88   
 
… every applicant does not have to go through full reconstructive surgery to meet 
the test, although some may do. The level of surgery required for each person will be 
particular to each person[.] 
 
This suggests that some surgery is required. This uncertainty is a problem for people who 
want to change the sex on their birth certificate. It is not appropriate that the level of 
intervention required is found in case law rather than clear legislation. The Transgender 
Report noted that a submitter had spent $2,000 on legal fees to go through this process.89 
Section 28 should be reformed in order to avoid this complexity. 
 
V Critique of the Medical Model 
 
In the previous Part, I outlined s 28 and discussed the uncertainty regarding surgery. This 
Part critiques s 28 more deeply by outlining the problems with the medical model of sex 
as it applies in this context. Romeo describes the medical model as a system “that 
regulates gender non-conformity and predicates legal rights on access to healthcare”.90 
Both the regulation of gender non-conformity and the requirement of healthcare as a 
prerequisite to accessing legal rights are present in the wording and operation of s 28. 
They intertwined to a large extent, since requiring medical intervention is itself based on 
normative assumptions about trans identity. 
 
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that s 28 actually requires that a person is “not 
a person of the nominated sex”91 and that the person has assumed the “gender identity of 
  
88 Department of Internal Affairs “General information regarding Declarations of Family Court as to sex to 
be shown on birth certificates” Department of Internal Affairs <www.dia.govt.nz> at 3. 
89 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [6.23]. 
90 Romeo, above n 33, at 730. 
91 Section 28(3)(b), (emphasis added). See Appendix for these provisions in full.  
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a person of the nominated sex”92 and wishes that sex to appear on their birth certificate.93 
Prima facie, this wording suggests that sex is biological and unchanging, while gender 
identity can change under a medical model.  
 
However, there are several reasons that the current interpretation of the legislation 
suggests a medical rather than biological approach to sex. Firstly, the phrase “the gender 
identity of a person of the nominated sex” suggests that each sex has a corresponding 
gender identity (and that each gender identity has a corresponding sex), and that these 
will be congruent.  Secondly, it is “sex” that is recorded on birth certificates, and it is 
“sex” that is changed by the s 28 process. Finally and most relevantly, judges generally 
read this provision merely as a repetition of s28(3)(a)(i), that a person’s birth certificate 
records the person as being of a sex opposite to the nominated sex, rather than treating it 
as an additional requirement.94 In keeping with this, my critique of the section proceeds 
on this basis that s 28 sets up a medical, rather than biological, approach to sex. 
 
Franklin Romeo has argued in the US context that the medical model of sex sets up 
hyper-normative standards of gender and fails to recognise lived experience and 
complexity.95 Courts recognise trans identity only when it conforms to expected 
standards; transgressive experiences of gender are fraudulent or illegitimate.96 The 
question is not whether the person has had the medical treatment appropriate for their 
needs, but whether the result is a “body and behaviour that sufficiently conform to 
normative gender standards so as to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the court.”97  
 
  
92 Section 28(3)(b)(i). 
93 Section 28(3)(b)(ii). 
94 Eg Michael, above n 60, at [56]-[57] and [84]-[85]; C-DCT, above n 81, at [6]-[7]; H, above n 71, at 
[21]-[22]; Kearney v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages of Auckland [2013] NZFC 4805 at 
[7] and [15]; KRM v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages of Wellington FC New Plymouth 
FAM-2009-043-000082 1 April 2009 at [4]. MMT, above n 85 is the only case where the distinction is 
made clear, at [9]. 
95 Romeo, above n 33, at 731. 
96 At 733. 
97 At 734. 
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Section 28 of the BDMRRA operates in a similar way. It gives medical “experts” (who 
are generally not trans) the power to scrutinise a person’s body and experience in order to 
decide whether they have “really” transitioned to the nominated sex. What is “desirable” 
for each person to complete their transition is not defined by the person themselves, nor 
even by their doctor, but by a standard of what is “usually” considered desirable by the 
medical profession as a whole.98 Individual cases are decided not in isolation but with 
reference to precedent, usually the Michael case. Direct comparisons are not often made 
explicitly; however, in AB, the applicant was classified as “further along the continuum 
than the applicant in Re Michael”.99 
 
One of the major normative assumptions about trans people is that they want, need and 
can afford all available medical intervention (and that they will qualify for it and be able 
to access it).100 This is explicit in s 28 itself, and further emphasised in the case law. The 
Michael judgment sets out the “typical” course of treatment expected of trans people in a 
passage cited in several subsequent cases:101  
 
There are typically four steps of treatment, namely psychiatric assessment, hormonal 
treatment, a period of living as a member of the opposite sex subject to professional 
supervision and therapy (the “real life experience”), and finally, in suitable cases, 
gender reassignment surgery. Surgical intervention takes many forms and, for a 
variety of reasons, is undertaken by different people to different extents. 
 
This suggests that trans people who do not access the full range of medical intervention 
expected of them are unlikely to meet the physical conformation requirement of the 
BDMRRA. I have already discussed surgery. “Real life experience” is sometimes 
mentioned but not emphasised as a requirement102 – possibly because it is generally 
  
98 Michael, above n 60, at [63]. 
99 Re AB FC Auckland FAM-2009-004-001341 16 November 2009 at [10]. 
100 Spade, above n 14, at 754-756. 
101 At [30]; quoted in AB above n 99 at [10] and H above n 71 at [17]. 
102 AB, above n 99, at [24]; DAC, above n 86, at [8] and [13]; H, above n 71, at [10], and [11]; Lucas v 
Registrar-General Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NZFC 6612 at [7]; Michael, above n 60 at [16] 
and [19]; MMT, above n 85, at [4]. 
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presumed to be met. In terms of psychological assessment, a diagnosis of gender identity 
disorder was mentioned in three cases103 and gender dysphoria was diagnosed once.104 
All of the other cases mention psychological assessment but do not use these labels.105 
Similarly, in all of the cases the applicant had been undergoing hormonal treatment, and 
intending to continue it permanently.106  
 
The medical model presents a barrier for people who cannot access medical intervention 
to the degree required, whether this is due to expense, discrimination, or the healthcare 
simply not being available.107 Most healthcare required by trans people is not publicly 
funded in New Zealand, and often trans people are excluded from healthcare that is 
available to other groups of people.108 For example, many trans people have to pay for 
their own psychological assessments (which are required under s 28, and also frequently 
needed as a prerequisite to accessing hormones).109 The Transgender Report found that 
people were paying up to $1000 for this assessment.110 Hormone treatment is not always 
accessible,111 and genital surgery is out of reach for most trans people, even if it is 
available in New Zealand.  
 
Gender-related healthcare is a necessity for many trans people, and I do not wish to 
detract from the need for substantial reform in this area.112 However, even if trans people 
were able to access the healthcare they required, there are deeper problems with legal 
  
103 AB, above n 99, at [24]; DAC, above n 86, at [8]-[9]; H, above n 71, at [6]-[7]. 
104 Michael, above n 60, at [16]. 
105 Basinger, above n 85, at [5] and [7]; C-DCT, above n 81, at [12]; Kearney, above n 94, at [10]; KRM, 
above n 94, at [10]; Lucas, above n 102 at [7]; MMT, above n 85, at [5]. 
106 AB, above n 99 at [6] and [8]; Basinger, above n 85 at [5] and [10]; C-DCT, above n 81, at [12] and 
[22]; DAC, above n 86, at [7]; H, above n 71, at [7] and [27]; Kearney, above n 94, at [4] and [10]; KRM, 
above n 94, at [7]; Lucas, above n 102, at [7]; Michael, above n 60, at [12]; MMT, above n 85 at [4] and [9].  
107 See generally Romeo, above n 33, at 734-738 and Spade, above n 14, at 751-759 for effects on low 
income people in the US context. 
108 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [5.36]-[5.37]. 
109 At [5.30]. 
110 At [5.21]-[5.25]. 
111 At [5.8], [5.17] and [5.71]. 
112 See Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at ch 5 for discussion of inequalities and discrimination in 
healthcare for trans people in NZ. 
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recognition being based on medical intervention. Some trans people have benefited from 
being recognised by the medical model of sex.113 Other trans people however, will never 
attain legal recognition from a system premised on medical authority over their bodies, 
either because it is impossible for them to express their identity and experiences in a way 
that fits this model,114 or because their political conception of their identity is so far 
removed from this model that they refuse to partake in it.115  
 
Some trans people are politically opposed to the medical model, but navigate it 
successfully in order to attain healthcare or legal recognition,116 by “selective recitation” 
of their experiences in a way that meets normative expectations. This includes emphasis 
on stereotypically gendered childhood experiences such as (for trans men) dressing up as 
a boy for halloween, playing with trucks instead of dolls, and having short hair.117 It also 
includes a desire to “pass” as one’s self-identified gender full-time.118 Spade himself 
rejects these narratives, but recognises the risk in doing so: “What is it means I’m not 
‘real’?”119  
 
Spade explains the inconsistency between trans experience and normative expectations in 
the following description of his experience trying to get chest surgery:120 
 
I was experiencing acutely the gulf between trans community understandings of our 
bodies, our experiences, and our liberation, and the medical interpretations of our 
lives. … My quest for body alteration had to be legitimized by a medical reference 
to, and a pretended belief in, a binary gender system that I had been working to 
dismantle since adolescence. Later, as I contended with my own legal gender status 
and that of my clients, I would learn that not only medical treatment, but also legal 
  
113 See Spade, above n 3, at 30. 
114 Jonathan L Koenig “Distributive Consequences of the Medical Model” (2011) 46 Harv CR-CL Law Rev 
619 at 627 and 629. 
115 Koenig above n 114 at 628-629. 
116 Spade, above n 3, at 23; Koenig above n 114 at 629; Vade, above n 6, at 272-273. 
117 Spade, above n 3, at 20 and 24. 
118 At 21. 
119 At 20. 
120 At 23-24. 
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rights and social services for trans people are dependent upon successful navigation 
of that medical system. 
 
While the context is different, Spade’s experiences illustrate the uncomfortable 
compromises trans people must make in order to attain recognition. It is impossible to 
know how many of the applicants in the available NZ cases were engaging in “selective 
recitation” of identity narratives. Given that legal recognition of their identity hinges on 
proving their “realness” to the courts, it is a logical strategy. The successful applicants 
could shape their narrative enough to fit the court’s requirements, but this leaves out 
those for whom this is impossible, either due to political conviction or because their 
reality is just too different to normative expectations to be able to shape their experience 
in that way. 
 
The medical model generally “does not serve the vast majority of gender non-conforming 
people.”121 This is highlighted by how few people have made use of s 28. Between 1995 
and 2007, 114 people made applications under this legislation.122 Between 2008 and 
2013, 105 applications were received.123 There is no definitive record of the number of 
trans people in New Zealand, because the census does not collect this information and no 
national studies have been done. However, it is suggested that there are “at least a few 
thousand” trans people in New Zealand.124 A 2012 survey reported that one per cent of 
high school students identified as transgender and a further three per cent as not sure,125 
suggesting that the trans population might be much larger than previously thought. In any 
case, 219 applications over an 18 year period, among a population of at least several 
thousand, shows that use of s 28 is not widespread. 
 
  
121 Romeo, above n 33, at 731. 
122 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [2.9]. 
123 McDonald, above n 23, at 5. 
124 McDonald, above n 23, at 5. 
125 TC Clark and others Youth’12 Overview: The health and wellbeing of New Zealand secondary school 
students in 2012 (University of Auckland, Auckland, 2012) at 25. 
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The Transgender Report recommended changing s 28(3)(c)(i)(B) to “has taken decisive 
steps to live fully and permanently in the gender identity of the nominated sex” while 
leaving the requirement that the Court is satisfied of this on the basis of medical 
evidence.126 While this would have been a step forward, especially prior to the Michael 
decision, such a provision would still be based on a medical model of gender and subject 
to the criticisms I have presented. 
 
Spade writes that the medical model was in its time a progressive step forward for trans 
people because it offered some rights as opposed to none: “to some extent, the 
medicalization of trans identity was at one time a progressive step toward dignity and 
equality because it was preferable to total illegitimacy and criminality.”127 The same is 
true in the New Zealand context: for those who have made use of it, s 28 has been an 
important piece of legislation, but there are now calls to reform this law.128 Given the 
problems inherent in a medical model of sex which I have outlined in this Part, it is time 
to move to a model based on self-identification rather than medical evidence. This is the 
focus of the next Part.  
 
VI Self-Identification for Birth Certificates in New Zealand  
 
There are many reasons that self-identification is an appropriate standard for changing 
sex markers on birth certificates in New Zealand. As demonstrated in the previous Part, 
the current medical model has significant flaws and does not serve the needs of the trans 
community. This Part looks at additional reasons for self-identification, followed by 
potential criticisms of this model and finally a suggestion for how it could look in 
practice. 
 
  
126 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [9.33]. 
127 Spade, above n 3, at 31-32. 
128 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 58, at [7]-[17] and [e]-[g]; and Draft Members Bill, prepared by 
members of the community and submitted to Louisa Wall MP, on file with author. 
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A Reasons that a Self-Identification Model is Appropriate in New Zealand 
 
Legal recognition of gender identity is a human right in international law. This is set out 
in the Yogyakarta Principles, which were developed as an application of existing 
international human rights instruments, such as the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
to rights in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity.129 These principles have 
“become recognised as a useful statement of international human rights law.”130 
Yogyakarta principle 3 states,131  
 
Each person’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their 
personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and 
freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo medical procedures, including sex 
reassignment surgery, sterilisation or hormonal therapy, as a requirement for legal 
recognition of their gender identity. 
 
One of the mechanisms for monitoring compliance with international human rights law is 
the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR). A submission was made to New 
Zealand’s 2013 UPR by the Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) 
Coalition, which was comprised of 11 organisations, including GenderBridge, Agender 
Christchurch, TransAdvocates and Intersex Trust Aotearoa. The submission pointed out 
that s 28 is in breach of Yogyakarta principle 3,132 and requested that the Government:133 
 
… enable adults with intersex conditions and trans and other gender diverse adults to 
change the sex details on any official documentation to male, female or 
  
129 “The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” (March 2007) Yogyakarta Principles 
<www.yogyakartaprinciples.org>. 
130 Human Rights Commission, above n 10, at 309 
131 “The Yogyakarta Principles”, above n 129, at 11-12. 
132 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 58, at [8] and [12]. 
133 At [f]. 
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indeterminate based solely on the individual’s self-identification, without any 
requirement for medical treatment and without the need to resort to a court process[.] 
 
Concern about human rights breaches has often focussed on mandatory sterilisation as a 
requirement for obtaining legal recognition of gender identity.134 This amounts to a 
violation of the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, in Article 5 of the UNDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR. The emphasis of this 
concern is often the requirement for surgery,135 but it should be noted that hormonal 
treatment also frequently results in sterilisation.136 Laws that require hormone therapy as 
a prerequisite to legal recognition (which is effectively the situation under s 28) are 
therefore also in breach of human rights. 
 
The SOGII UPR submission also picked up on this, and recommended that the 
Government:137 
 
… remove any requirement to undergo or intend to undergo medical or surgical 
procedures, including those that may result in sterilisation, as a prerequisite for 
changing sex details on a birth certificate or other official document[.] 
 
The recommendations in the SOGII submission were not included in the 
recommendations made to New Zealand by the Universal Periodic Review. However, the 
Government has indicated an intention to “follow up on these issues”.138  
 
  
134 Juan Méndez Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/22/53, February 2013) at [38], [78], 
[79], and [88]. 
135 At [77] 
136 Eli Coleman and others Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender and Gender-
Nonconforming People (7th ed, World Professional Association for Transgender Health, [no location 
given], 2012) at 50. 
137 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 58, at [e]. 
138 New Zealand Government “New Zealand Government Response to 2014 UPR recommendations” 
Human Rights Commission < www.hrc.co.nz> at [3]. 
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Another reason for change is that self-identification already exists in New Zealand in two 
important contexts. The DIA changed the passport policy in 2012. Previously, a trans 
person who had not changed the sex details on their birth certificate could only change 
their passport sex marker to “X”. Now, an applicant can choose the sex that appears on 
their passport (M, F, or X) even if this conflicts with the sex on their birth certificate.139 
The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) also changed its policy in 2013. While sex 
details do not appear on drivers’ licenses, they are kept in a register by NZTA, which is 
accessible by police officers. The options are now male, female or indeterminate.140 The 
New Zealand passport policy is thought to be the most progressive passport policy in the 
world.141  
 
As discussed in Part II, passports are accepted as identity documents in most contexts. It 
makes sense to have the same standard for birth certificates as for passports, as there is no 
material difference in their function as identity documents and not everyone has a 
passport or wishes to get one.142 Additionally, for the majority of people who do have 
both a passport and a birth certificate, it makes sense for these to be consistent. 
 
According to the Transgender Report:143 
 
The Department of Internal Affairs said the rationale supporting their transgender 
policies focused on the need for certainty and accuracy in the information recorded 
on the registers of births, deaths and marriages and on certificates issued on the basis 
of that information. Officials said: ‘This need for certainty, however, is balanced to a 
certain extent, against an individual’s right to identify themselves as they see fit.’ 
 
  
139 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 24. 
140 New Zealand Transport Agency “Replacing or changing your licence” New Zealand Transport Agency 
<www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
141 Byrne, above n 58, at 20-21. 
142 The ACT Law Reform Advisory Council made this point when considering options for legislative 
reform in the ACT – ACT Law Reform Advisory Council Beyond the Binary: legal recognition of sex and 
gender diversity in the ACT (ACT Law Reform Advisory Council, LRAC 2, March 2012) at 39-40. 
143 Human Rights Commission, above n 4, at [8.30]. 
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It further noted:144 
 
There are legitimate and important state interests in ensuring that birth certificates 
and other similar documents accurate reflect the true details of a person’s identity 
(such as their sex) to prevent the fraudulent or unlawful use of the document. 
 
It is interesting that a restrictive approach to changing the sex marker on birth certificates 
is here characterised as certain and accurate, and contrasted with self-identification. The 
opposite is in fact true: laws which make it difficult to change one’s birth certificate mean 
that there is inconsistency between a person’s birth certificate, their recorded sex on other 
documents (for example, licences and passports), and their identity. This leads to more 
inaccuracy, confusion and inconsistency than a model based on self-identification would. 
B Responses to Potential Concerns 
 
Section 28 of the BDMRRA has not been debated in New Zealand since it passed in 
1995. The recent DIA and NZTA policy changes do not seem to have provoked any 
criticism or backlash. As such, it is difficult to assess what the concerns might be raised 
about a model of self-identification in New Zealand. Some common concerns that have 
been raised internationally, and responses to them, are as follows. 
 
One argument is that self-identification on birth certificates could lead to identity 
fraud.145 This overlooks that sex markers identify a person as being one person of roughly 
50 per cent of the population and are not a useful form of identification.146 Fraud could be 
far more easily committed by changing one’s name, which is very easy to do by statutory 
declaration in New Zealand.147 In any case, fraud is a crime and would be treated as such 
  
144 At [8.32]. 
145 Transgender Europe, above n 58, at 60; and Kristin Wenstrom ““What the Birth Certificate Shows”: An 
Argument To Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment Policies” (2008) 17 Law 
& Sexuality Rev 131 at 154. 
146 Spade, above n 14 at 802-803. 
147 Department of Internal Affairs “Changing a Name” Department of Internal Affairs <www.dia.govt.nz>. 
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if it arose.148 During the first year after the passage of Argentina’s legislation, 3,000 
people changed their identity documents with no reported cases of fraud.149 
 
Another argument is that men would change their sex to female in order to access, for 
example, women’s prisons, or other gender-segregated spaces.150 Underlying this concern 
that people with “male” genitalia will be allowed in female spaces is an implicit fear that 
trans women are more likely to be physically or sexually violent towards other women, 
which is a baseless assumption.151 Additionally, arguments like this tend to shift the focus 
away from policies which actually make those spaces safer for women.152  
 
Another concern is that people would “change back” to their “original” gender.153 This is 
reflected in s 28’s requirement for permanency.154 Critics have failed to point out why 
this would actually be a problem. Most trans people do not “change back”.155 More 
importantly however, if people do wish to change their identity more than once there 
should not be barriers to doing so.156 The Argentinian law explicitly recognises this 
(although subsequent changes require judicial authorisation).157 The analogy can again be 
made to name changes: divorced women frequently revert to their maiden name and this 
does not create any problems.158 There is no logical reason for sex markers to be treated 
any differently. 
 
 
  
148 Crimes Act 1961 ss 228, 240 and 241. 
149 Transgender Europe, above n 58, at 60. 
150 Transgender Europe, above n 58, at 60; Wenstrom above n 145, at 147. 
151 Wenstrom above n 145, at 148 and 151; Spade, above n 14, at 810. 
152 Wenstrom above n 145, at 149. 
153 Transgender Europe, above n 58, at 61; Wenstrom above n 145, at 156. 
154 Section 28(3)(c)(i)(C). 
155 Wenstrom above n 145, at 156. 
156 Byrne, above n 58, at 18-19; Wenstrom above n 145, at 156. 
157 Article 8. 
158 Wenstrom, above n 151, at 156-157. 
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C The Implementation of a Self-Identification Model to Birth Certificates 
 
Adopting a self-identification would create more consistency between records. It would 
also allow trans people an important affirmation of their identity, and reduce the barriers 
for recognition in other contexts, as described in Part II. There are two obvious models 
for doing this. The first is the DIA and NZTA policies described above. The other is the 
Argentinian law, which as discussed in Part III, is praised by activists internationally. 
 
The DIA and NZTA policies require a statutory declaration by the applicant expressing 
which gender they want to be recorded as, and how long they have lived in that gender 
(although nothing turns on this second requirement).159 Each of these policies also 
includes a third option for people who do not identify with either of the binary genders 
(“X” and “indeterminate” respectively),160 and allow unlimited changes (although the 
DIA points out that multiple changes may cause issues when travelling 
internationally).161 They both conform with the international best practice.162  
 
Similarly, Argentina’s Gender Identity Law provides an example of how this model can 
be applied to birth certificates. As already mentioned, it is generally seen as the most 
progressive gender recognition legislation. A similar law has recently passed in 
Denmark,163 and Malta is also considering this model.164 There are several proposed bills 
in Ireland, one of which models the Argentinian law very closely.165 This Irish bill 
  
159 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 24; New Zealand Transport Agency, above n 140. 
160 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 24; New Zealand Transport Agency, above n 140. 
161 Department of Internal Affairs, above n24. 
162 Byrne, above n 58, at 20-21 discusses these policies. They also conform with the best practice set out in 
Transgender Europe, above n 58, at 57-59. 
163 ILGA Europe “Denmark becomes the first European country to allow legal change of gender without 
clinical diagnosis” ILGA Europe <www.ilga-europe.org>. 
164 Neil Falzon “A Proposed Gender Identity Act for Malta” (December 2010) Malta Gay Rights Movement 
<www.maltagayrights.org>. 
165 Legal Recognition of Gender Bill 2013 (75) (introduced as member’s bill by Snodlaigh). 
  
 
33
provides an illustration of how self-identification can work in a Common Law 
jurisdiction.166 
 
Section 28 should be reformed so that it simply requires a statutory declaration of a 
person’s sex. Statutory declarations must be in the form prescribed in schedule 1 of the 
Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, and signed by an authorised person, such as a lawyer or 
Justice of the Peace.167 This would remove the need for medical evidence and 
significantly simplify the process. The authorised person would not determine the validity 
of the applicant’s sex, but verify that the person had signed the statutory declaration. 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
The provision for changing sex markers on birth certificates in section 28 of the 
BDMRRA does not enable the majority of trans people to make this change. As I have 
shown, birth certificates matter to trans people because they are an expression of identity 
and citizenship, and because birth certificates with the correct sex marker can facilitate 
recognition of identity in other settings. I have set out the three major legal approaches to 
sex: biological, medical, and self-identification. Each of these is currently followed in 
different jurisdictions with regard to birth certificates. Argentina was the first country to 
adopt the self-identification approach, and others are looking to this example. 
 
Section 28 of the BMDRRA is based on the medical model, because it requires medical 
evidence of physical conformity of the applicant’s body to that of a person of the 
“nominated sex”. Michael and other cases have established that surgery is not always 
required; however the exact requirement here remains unclear. While not all applicants in 
the available cases had undergone surgery, all expressed some degree of desire for it. 
Additionally, all of the applicants were undergoing hormone treatment and all had had a 
psychological assessment. These are all normative expectations of trans experience. 
  
166 Byrne, above n 58, at 36. 
167 Authorised people are set out in s 9 of the Oaths and Declarations act 1957. 
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Some people’s experiences fit these requirements; however many others cannot afford, 
cannot access, or do not want this medical intervention. 
 
The current law is inconsistent with the right to self-determination of gender identity set 
out in Yogyakarta principle 3, both by requiring medical evidence at all and by requiring 
hormone treatment, which frequently results in sterilisation. Self-identification already 
exists in New Zealand for passports and drivers’ licences, and it makes sense to have a 
consistent approach. I have demonstrated that potential concerns raised about the self-
identification model are likely to be unfounded. Finally, I have suggested that s 28 should 
be amended to require a statutory declaration as to the applicant’s sex. 
 
The reform of s 28 so that it is based on self-identification rather than the medical model 
would remove one of the barriers that trans people currently face in seeking legal 
recognition of their identity. Any reform that occurs must take into account other 
criticisms of the current law, and must be done in consultation with trans, intersex, and 
other relevant communities. 
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Appendix: s 28 of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships 
Registration Act 1995 
 
28 Declarations of Family Court as to sex to be shown on birth certificates issued for 
adults 
  (1)Subject to subsection (3), a Family Court may, on the application of an 
eligible adult (the applicant), declare that it is appropriate that birth certificates 
issued in respect of the applicant should contain the information that the applicant 
is a person of a sex specified in the application (in subsection (3) referred to as the 
nominated sex). 
 (2)The court must cause a copy of the application to be served on— 
   (a)the Registrar-General, if the applicant's birth is registered or is 
registrable under this Act but is not yet registered; and 
   (b)any other person who, in the court's opinion, is interested in it 
or might be affected by the granting of the declaration. 
 (3)The court shall issue the declaration if, and only if,— 
   (a)it is satisfied either that the applicant's birth is registrable 
under this Act but is not yet registered, or that there is included in the 
record of the applicant's birth— 
   (i)information that the applicant is a person of the sex 
opposite to the nominated sex; or 
   (ii)information that the applicant is a person of 
indeterminate sex; or 
   (iii)no information at all as to the applicant's sex; and 
   (b)it is satisfied that the applicant is not a person of the 
nominated sex, but— 
   (i)has assumed and intends to maintain, or has always had 
and intends to maintain, the gender identity of a person of the 
nominated sex; and 
   (ii)wishes the nominated sex to appear on birth 
certificates issued in respect of the applicant; and 
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   (c)either— 
   (i)it is satisfied, on the basis of expert medical evidence, 
that the applicant— 
   (A)has assumed (or has always had) the gender 
identity of a person of the nominated sex; and 
   (B)has undergone such medical treatment as is 
usually regarded by medical experts as desirable to enable 
persons of the genetic and physical conformation of the 
applicant at birth to acquire a physical conformation that 
accords with the gender identity of a person of the 
nominated sex; and 
   (C)will, as a result of the medical treatment 
undertaken, maintain a gender identity of a person of the 
nominated sex; or 
   (ii)it is satisfied that the applicant's sexual assignment or 
reassignment as a person of the nominated sex has been recorded 
or recognised in accordance with the laws of a State for the time 
being recognised for the purposes of this section by the Minister by 
notice in the Gazette. 
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